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Abstract: DNA proof inherently
involves the use of probability theory,
which is often counterintuitive. Visual
depictions of probability theory, how-
ever, can clarify the analysis and make
it tractable. A DNA hit from a large data-
base is a notoriously difficult probability
theory issue, yet the visuals should en-
able courts and juries to handle it. The
Puckett facts are an example of a general
approach: A search in a large DNA data-
base produces a hit for a cold crime from
1972 San Francisco. Probability theory
allows us to process the probabilities that
someone else in the database, someone
not in the database, or the initial suspect,
Baker, may be the perpetrator and obtain
the probability of Puckett's guilt. Given
the clarity of this analysis, decisions that
do not follow it deserve reversal as clear-
ly erroneous.
1 Harold R. Woodard Professor of Law, Indi-
ana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law,
Indianapolis, ngeorgak@iu.edu. Special thanks
go to Barry Nalebuff who engaged our discussion
wholeheartedly. I also wish to thank John Donohue,
David Kaye, Erin Murphy, Richard Posner, and
Eric Talley for helpful comments and Susan David
DeMaine for exceptional librarian and editing as-
sistance {.
A disease test with 90% accuracy is actually accurate
less than 10% when the incidence of the disease is
1%. My guess that the prize is behind the second of
three doors, followed by the game host giving me the
information that the prize is not behind the first door
(information that appears pointless) has half the chance
of success of the alternative, switching my selection
to door three. These statements, which are borderline
nonsensical, are actually true. They capture two of the
several paradoxes of probability theory.2 Criminal trials
on the basis of identifications from large DNA data-
bases are not quite as paradoxical but getting our heads
around their probability theory is a monumental task.
So limited seems our ability that I have formed the be-
lief that our difficulty with probabilistic analysis is part
of human nature, the result of evolution.' No surprise
2 The first is the rare disease or false positive
paradox and the second is the three door or Monty
Hall Paradox. See generally M.H. Rheinfurth and
L.W. Howell, Probability and Statistics in Aero-
space Engineering, NASA, http://ntrs.nasa.gov/
archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19980045313.pdf
(April 26, 2015).
3 Perhaps a mutation that facilitated probabi-
listic analysis appeared in some early hominids, but
those went neither to hunt the sabretooth tiger nor
to gather fruit in its habitat. Those with the muta-
tion giving a good sense for probability theory, I
posit, did not explore new lands, seas, or technolo-
gies. They did not write poems and songs about
unrequited love. They settled and were selected out
of existence by the hunters, the explorers, and the
starry-eyed romantics. Perhaps, understanding prob-
ability analysis is an evolutionarily unfit trait that
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comes from realizing that probability theory devel-
oped at about the same time as the calculus because
it is about as unnatural for our thinking.4 The mode of
analysis necessary to evaluate DNA evidence from a
large database is even more recent, dating from the
publication of Bayesian analysis in 1763.1 The counterin-
tuitive nature of probability theory is especially evident
when courts seek to assess the probative value of DNA
evidence when the source of that evidence is a large da-
tabase.6 DNA databases are enormous and the accuracy
of the test presents odds ratios involving numbers well
over a million.7
Besides the visualizations, the contribution of this analy-
sis is that it proposes the correct analysis when a DNA
match arises from the trawl through a large database.
The National Research Council has proposed two differ-
ent adjustments to the random match probability but
both have inadequacies, waste information, and do not
take advantage of the surrounding environment of the
criminal identification.'
we cannot have.
4 See generally R.R., The Discovery of Calcu-
lus, Science Reviews 2000 Ltd. (1919), http://www.
jstor.org/stable/43427110 (April 26, 2015) (Isaak
Newton and Gottfried Leibnitz discovered the cal-
culus simultaneously around 1666 to 1684.).
5 See generally Roger North, The Mathemati-
cal Gazette: The Mathematical Career ofPierre
de Fermat by Michael Sean Mahoney, Math-
ematical Association (1974), http://www.jstor.org/
stable/3616110 (April 26, 2015) (demonstrating that
modem rigorous probability theory dates from cor-
respondence between Pierre de Fermat and Blaise
Pascal in 1654); Joseph Berkson, Bayes'Theorem,
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics (1930),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2957673 (April 26,
2015) (stating that the Bayesian analysis applied to
this issue dates from 1763).
6 David H. Kaye, Rounding up the Usual Sus-
pects: A Legal and Logical Analysis ofDNA Trawl-
ing Cases, 87 N. CAR. L. REv. 425 (2009) (offering
an eloquent overview of the courts' attempts to deal
with large database DNA evidence).
7 See Jan Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, The Rule
ofProbabilities: A Practical Approach for Applying
Bayes'Rule to the Analysis ofDNA Evidence, 67
STANF. L. REv. 1447 (2015) (noting the complexity
of DNA analyses).
8 The National Research Council has sug-
Part II introduces visualizing with the rare disease test.
Part Ill lays the foundation for visualizing the typical
problem presented in People v. Puckett,9 where Puckett
was convicted in 2008 for a 1972 rape-murder on the
basis of DNA evidence and an investigated suspect,
Baker, had not been prosecuted. The generality of the
setting is important: The analysis applies in every case
of a perpetrator identification through DNA testing of
a large database. Part IV visualizes the three possible
scenarios that the early suspect was the perpetrator,
that the perpetrator was not in the database, and that
the perpetrator was in the database. Part V produces
the corresponding probability tree, and Part VI does
the number crunching to calculate the probability of
Puckett's guilt, which turns out to be almost 99%. The
conclusion circles back to the treatment of evidence
that would allow the courts to perform the probability
theory analysis.
II. THE RARE DISEASE PARADOX
Suppose a disease infects one percent (1%) of the popu-
lation, and a relatively accurate test exists for this dis-
ease, one that has 90% accuracy. Importantly, accuracy
gested two adjustments. In its first report, it recom-
mended that database searches only use a few of
the places (loci) where human DNA has the differ-
ences that are used for identification and after the
search reveals a suspect, that suspect's identification
proceed on the basis of the remaining of the 13 loci
that the database holds. For example, the database
search uses data of 8 of the loci from the sample
at the crime scene to identify a suspect; then, the
remaining 5 loci confirm the suspect's identity. The
second report suggested that the odds ratio of the
test's error be multiplied by the size of the database.
For example, if the test errs once in a billion, and
the database has one million members the error rate
becomes one million in one billion or one in a thou-
sand. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 436-43; Comm.
on DNA Tech. in Forensic Sci., Nat'l Research
Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science, 124
(1992) ("NRC I"); Comm. on DNA Forensic Sci.:
An Update, Nat'l Research Council, The Evaluation
ofForensic DNA Evidence 134 (1996) ("NRC II").
9 People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2008). See generally Kaye, supra
note 5; Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 6 (citing
People v. Puckett).
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"A DISEASE TEST WITH 90% ACCURACY S ACTUALLY ACCURATE
LESS THAN 10% WHEN THE INCIDENCE OF THE DISEASE S 1%."
means that the test both identifies infected individuals
with 90% probability (what some disciplines call sen-
sitivity, true positive rate, or recall rate) and identifies
healthy individuals with 90% probability (this aspect of
accuracy some disciplines call specificity, or true nega-
tive rate), or conversely, fails to identify them as healthy
with 10% probability. The paradox appears when we
posit that an entirely random individual receives a posi-
tive result, a result that flags this person as infected.
The usual lay intuition is that this person's infection
probability is near 90%, but the actual probability of
infection is under 10%. What drives this discrepancy be-
tween our intuition and the accurate calculation is that
our intuition does not account for false negatives: the
frequency with which the test flags healthy subjects as
infected. The accurate calculation requires us to realize
that because the uninfected population is so large, the
proportionately few false positives they will receive are
actually many in comparison to the few true positives of
the tiny infected fraction of the population.
A visual representation of the paradox illustrates the
accurate approach. Consider Figure 1, a grid of one
thousand dots, ten of which, 1%, are black and the rest
are white. This represents the reality of a population
with 1% infected individuals.
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Figur 1: A gri of 1,00 dots 1% of 7 whic arlcthtcre
sponds to the paradox of the rare disease test. This is the true state of the world
to which an imperfectly accurate test is applied.
When we apply the test for the rare disease to this
population, the result contains errors. The errors take
two forms, false negatives and false positives. A false
negative occurs when the test of an infected individual
(one of the black dots in Figure 1) flags that person as
uninfected, as a white dot. A false positive presents an
uninfected individual as infected. Figure 2 has randomly
flipped the color of one dot in each row of ten, produc-
ing a 10% error in the observations of the true state of
the dots from Figure 1.
Once we visualize the false positives, their frequency
becomes apparent. An individual receives a positive
test. How probable is it that this positive result is one of
the infected dots versus the false positives?
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Figure 2: The 10% error rate of the test reverses one dot in each
row of ten.
Only nine true positives exist in a sea that includes
ninety-nine false positives. Given a black dot, the prob-
ability that it is true is nine in one hundred eight (the
total number of black dots), under ten percent (actually
8 A F%), despite the test's ninety percent accuracy.
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Figure 3: The probability tree that corresponds to the paradox of the crime scene, we must start with the San Francisco of
the rare disease test. The probability of a positive being true has as its denomi- 1972.
nator the sum of the probability weights that correspond to all positives, the
italicized endpoints. Its numerator is the probability weight that corresponds to






To confirm the accuracy of this analysis, let us also visu-
alize it as a probability tree, as in Figure 3. To calculate
the probability of infection given a positive signal, we
must account for all possibilities of observing a positive,
which are two, a true positive and a false positive, the
italicized endpoints of the probability tree. The denomi-
nator must hold the sum of the probability weights that
correspond to all positives. In this case, the true posi-
tive occurs when a subject is infected (p, = 1%) and the
test is correct (p, = 90%), for probability weight of .01
x .90 = .009. The false positive occurs when a subject is
not infected (1-p,= 99%) and the test is false (1 -p,
10%), for a probability weight of .99 x .10 = .099. The
sum of those two, .108, is the denominator. The nu-
merator is the first of the two, the probability weight
that corresponds to a true positive, the endpoint of the
probability tree that is in bold (as well as in italics). That
is .01 x .90. The result is the same 8Y% calculated in the
graphical approach. Table 1 presents this calculation.
Case: Calculation:
True Positive: pp, = .009
False Positive: (1-p) (1-p,) = .099
Numerator: .009
Denominator: .009 + .099 = .108
Probability: .009/.108 = .083
Table 1: The probability weights of each case of a positive in the rare disease
test leading to the calculation of the probability that a positive is a true posi-
tive.
The DNA test in Puckett is more complex, but the
principle is the same. We receive a signal, that is, we
see a black dot or a positive DNA test. We need, first,
to determine the universe of black dots, true and false.
Second, we must calculate the probability that this
signal corresponds to a true black dot, i.e., a correctly
convicting DNA test. But, just as detectives must start at
true positive
true negativ~e
III. VISUALIZING 1972 SAN FRANCISCO
Over 40 years ago, twenty-two year old Diana Sylvester
was found dead in her apartment in San Francisco.to
She had been raped and murdered a few days before
Christmas 1972.
In 2003, California police check a preserved DNA sample
against the California database containing felons' DNA.
John Puckett is a match. What is the probability that
he is guilty? The setting presents a similar paradox to
the rare disease case in the sense that the accuracy of
the test is very large but applying it to a database of
that size would produce a false positive with significant
probability."
The first layer of complexity is that the match comes
10 See Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 6, at 1467-
68; Michael Bobelian, DNA's Dirty Little Secret,
Washington Monthly (March/April 2010), http://
www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1003.
bobelian.html.
11 The error rate of the test according to the
prosecution's expert was one in 1,100,000, mean-
ing that one person in 1,100,000 individuals who
were not the sources of the DNA would have the
same DNA sequence ("random match probability").
Applied to the database that had 338,711 elements
produces a random false positive with about 26.5%
probability. See infra note 12. See generally Erin
Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layper-
son ' Guide to the Subjectivity Inherent in Forensic
DNA Typing, 58 EMORY L.J. 489 (2008) (discussing
the mechanics of DNA identification and its exces-
sive purported accuracy including excellent graph-
ics).
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from the DNA database, but the suspect must come
from the people who were in San Francisco at the time
of the crime in 1972 and were of rape-committing age.
For simplicity, I will call this the [population of] 1972 San
Francisco. Most entries in the database are not from
1972 San Francisco.
rape-committing age in 1972 and has no alibi. 12 Figure 5
illustrates this approach by circling successively smaller
fractions of the database. The figure also illustrates the
alternative approach to estimating the intersection: by
taking successively smaller fractions of the San Francisco
population.13 These correspond to its male fraction,
its Caucasian fraction, and, finally, its fraction on the
3- 7 213 F o p E-A oEmo~
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Figure 4: An illustration of the population of 1972 San Francisco
(stylized to one thousand) and its intersection with the relevant population
of the DNA database (stylized to two thousand). The intersection holds one
hundred elements, ten percent of the population of San Francisco and five
percent of the database.
For the visualization, let us temporarily reduce the size
of the population of 1972 San Francisco to one thou-
sand and the size of the database to two thousand.
Suppose that their intersection, their relevant commor
elements, holds a hundred members. Figure 4 illustrate
this overlap.
Assessing the probative power of a DNA test depends
on the size of the intersection, the population both in
the DNA database and in San Francisco at the time of
the crime. One approach is to estimate the fraction of
the database that is male, then the fraction that is Cau-
casian (because a witness saw a Caucasian man in the
victim's apartment), and, finally, the fraction that was of
DNADraatae
88MN9 M89MB 9MMI SEMM
OwnBEs MS 8888882 M WE BEEBE 8858
SEMSM 888 SM88 8I888858 H2888888
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~ U9U98SH898 WSR 8289 S98S8ES M EBEUH
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Mapranotemian
SBSBESS BSBBEBIBBS 82gEIBB MO S38m gms99 M MRH
888588 MO8 MS188 88881 8 88838M2W58 8M 8M ma
SIR== HIM= 2999=M == 9=9
12 This is, simplified, the approach that Ayres
and Nalebuff use. See generally Ayres & Nalebuff,
supra note 6.
13 This is analogous to the simpler estimation
based on the Bay area population that Kaye uses.
See generally Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 6.
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IV. THE THREE ALTERNATIVES
Figure 5: Different approaches to esti-
mating the overlap of the population and the da-
tabase.
The method of approaching the
estimate of the intersection changes
the inquiry in intuitive ways. For
example, one who starts from the
database needs to ask what frac-
tion of the database was of age in
1972. Also, the fraction male and
Caucasian has, then, as its denomi-
nator the database population. By
contrast, one who approaches
the estimate from the 1972 San
Francisco population has already
excluded implicitly individuals who 2
are too young for the crime in 1972
and those with an alibi of being
elsewhere. Also, the fractions of
males and Caucasians that matter
are those of San Francisco, i.e., their O
denominator is the 1972 population .
of San Francisco. 14
In sum, the first issue is estimating the population at the
intersection of the population and the database. The
next hurdle is to identify the possible alternative perpe-
trators.
Figure 6: Baker (B), unknown (U), and Puckett (P) as possible
positions relative to the intersection of the San Francisco population and the
DNA database.
14 For example, based on census data one
could estimate the 1972 San Francisco population
at 720 thousand, its Caucasian fraction at 60%, and
take the fraction with which Caucasians end in the
felons' DNA database at about 2%, to produce an
estimate of the intersection of about 720,000 x .6
x .02 = 8,640. This is quite close to the estimate
formed by the method of Ayres and Nalebuff of
about 8,790, see infra, text following note 27. Kaye
approximates this intersection by using the 2003
population of the entire Bay area to about 2 million.
See Kaye, supra note 5 at 491. If he were to reduce
that to the proportion Caucasian, say 50%, and in
the database, 2%, that would yield an intersection
of about 50,000, still far larger, but likely near the
maximum that the defense could plausibly argue to
be reasonable.
-3
D 14 A D ualas
T l t p r at e :
Teataieperpetrators arnkow nthree The perta-e
or someone in the database (who most likely is Puck-
ett unless the perpetrator received an unlikely false
negative and Puckett a false positive). Baker died in
1978 without leaving a DNA sample.'5 If Baker was the
perpetrator, Puckett received a false positive. Similarly,
Puckett received a false positive if the perpetrator was
an unknown who is not in the database. Finally, the per-
petrator may be in the database, in which case we are
most likely observing a correct identification of Puckett
as the perpetrator but the possibility exists that Puckett
is a false positive that arises after the true perpetrator
received a false negative.
Figure 6 illustrates these three alternatives by identify-
ing three points with B, U, and P. The location of the
three points is significant. The first two, B (Baker), and U
(the unknown) lie in that part of the population of San
Francisco that corresponds to the subset that is male
and Caucasian but outside the subset that overlaps with
the DNA database. Puckett's P, on the other hand, is in
the intersection.
15 Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 6 at 1487.
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Baker is the perpetrator and we observe a false ) 0 0 0
positive. The false positive arises in the inter- 3 0 0 0
section, the shared elements between the San ) 000
Francisco population and the DNA database.
Baker, identified with a B, is not in that subset 3 0 0
but is part of the male and Caucasian subset of '
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The first possible world is the one where Baker was the
perpetrator and we observe a false positive from the
DNA database. Figure 7 illustrates this world. One of the
hundred points at the intersection of the San Francisco
population and the DNA database is black and corre-
sponds to the false positive.16 We see with a B the loca-
tion of Baker. While this visualization shows one black
dot in a hundred, the corresponding exact calculation
comes in Part V, with the probability tree, figure 10.
The second possible world is where the perpetrator
was an unknown person who is not in the database.
Figure 8, not very different from the previous picture,
illustrates this alternative. The U denotes the unknown
person who committed the crime. This unknown person
is male and Caucasian, but is not in the database. One of
the points in the intersection of the population and the
database appears black as a false positive.
16 Figure 7 shows one of the hundred dots at
the intersection as black. This does not correspond
to a test with 99% accuracy but rather to one with
accuracy of 99.9899502%, because 99.9899502100 =
.99. DNA tests generally have much greater accu-
racy, with error rates measured as one in billions. In
Puckett's case, the naYve position that the positive
was merely the result of applying it to the entire
database of 338,711 samples gives the impression
that the probability of a false positive was the ac-
curacy of the test, 1,099,999/1,100,000, raised to
that power, which gives a probability of producing
that number of correct negatives was slightly under
73.5% and, therefore, the probability of false posi-























Figure 8: The second possibility is that an unknown individual U,








































The third and last alternative is that the perpetrator is in
the database. One might think that Puckett corresponds
to a single black dot but that is wrong because Puck-
ett's guilt is a virtually certain phenomenon in this third
alternative. For the purpose of the illustration, Puck-
ett's point is the entire intersection: If Puckett is guilty
we almost always see a true positive with the unlikely
exception of a false negative that exonerated the perpe-
trator, followed by an also unlikely false positive finger-
ing Puckett. To visualize the corresponding almost 100%
probability of having identified Puckett in juxtaposition
with our prior rare false positives, superimpose the
100% reality on the intersection in those same graphs to
see the intersection as mostly black dots. Thereafter we
can see the possibility that the true perpetrator experi-
ences the rare false negative by leaving white a dot (or
a fraction of one) corresponding to the probability of a
false negative."
17 In the setting of this visualization letting
an entire dot be white strongly overstates the prob-
3o Washington College of Law Fall 2o5
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Figure 9: Puckett's guilt occupies most of the probability space,
which takes the shape of the intersection of the San Francisco population and
the database to be comparable to the alternatives. The only caveat is a false
negative, but we can visualize it as a partially white dot, one tenth white for
a test with 99.9% accuracy. The fractional filling of about a hundredth of the
white space corresponds to a false positive after a false negative.
One possibility still remains. In the case that the true
perpetrator is in the database and surprisingly receives
a false negative, then the remaining members of the
intersection of the population and the database might
not all receive true negatives and a false positive may
still arise. In terms of the visualization, a very small
fraction of the (likely partially) empty dot that signified
Puckett's false negative is black. That, however, must be
accounted in the probability space of false positives. In
other words, the fraction of the dot that can arise as a
false positive after the perpetrator receives a false nega-
tive should be added to the probability weight that the
first two figures produce and which corresponds to false
positives.
Unlike the disease setting, where many black dots were
associated with false positives, here the odds favor the
true positives. The visual, stylized representation of
the Puckett setting gives us 99.9 true positives versus
two and a very small fraction of false positives, while
considering (i) the three scenarios as equally likely and
(ii) the test to have accuracy that produces ninety nine
true negatives in a hundred. The DNA tests are a lot
more accurate, the estimated probabilities of the three
scenarios are unequal, and the analysis needs to remain
sensitive to changes of the estimates of the various
ability of a false negative. In the prior two figures
the number of black dots was one, implying that
the test's accuracy is 99.9899502% (See supra note
12). To be consistent, about one hundredth of a dot
should be white here.
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'While the rare disease test produced a simple prob-
OOsbility tree, the trial setting produces a complex one
ecause of the several uncertainties.
OO The initial branching corresponds to the most general
O ncertainty, whether a different suspect was the true
perpetrator, who in Puckett was Baker. This forms
the initial branching between the probability PB that
this other (Baker) was the perpetrator and 1-p. that
he was not." If Baker was not the perpetrator, the next
uncertainty is whether the perpetrator was in the inter-
section of the DNA database and the population. The
corresponding branching is that the perpetrator was in
the database with probability Pd and was not in it with
probability 1-Pd'
From (1) the node corresponding to another (Baker)
being the perpetrator and from (2) the node corre-
sponding to the perpetrator not being in the database,
the subsequent branching is identical because in both
cases any positives are false positives and the intersec-
tion of the database and the population holds the same
number of members, N. The branching is triple, with the
first case being that all members receive correct nega-
tive tests. 19 The test correctly rejects a DNA match with
probability r.20 Because all members must receive a true
18 The same analysis applies if more than one
alternative suspect exist. The probability assigned
to Baker in this example would need to be adjusted
to include the cumulative probability of all other
suspects. If the two alternative suspects, for exam-
ple, were Able and Charlie, with Able having a 20%
probability of being the perpetrator and Charlie a
5% probability, the appropriate value ofp, would
be .25.
19 A simpler analysis merely bifurcates here
between everyone receiving true negatives with
probability r" or not, 1- r". This produces the prob-
ability tree for one or more positives, however. At
sample sizes like this one, where much less than one
false positive is expected on average, this calcula-
tion is not very different, as table 2 and note 28
show and as Part VII explains. See infra note 34.
20 This is the rate of accuracy of the test, also
known as the true negative rate or specificity of the
8
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negative, the operation is multiplicative. Say r were .90,
for simplicity. Ninety percent of the time, then, the first
test would be negative. The second would also be nega-
tive ninety percent of ninety percent of the time or .90
squared, and the third also ninety of ninety of ninety, or
.90 cubed. Accordingly, the probability of all N members
receiving correct negative tests is the accuracy of the
test r raised to the power of the number of members of
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Figure 10: The probability tree for exactly one positive. The itali-
cized endpoints correspond to observations of exactly one positive. The sum of
their probability weights forms the denominator of the probability of Puckett's
guilt with the numerator being the probability weight that corresponds to the
true positive, the bolded endpoint. Ayres and Nalebuff treat the starred false
positive in a footnote, justifiably considering it trivial, but the graphical analy-
sis lets it remain in the foreground.
The second branch of the triple branching corresponds
to exactly one member of the intersection receiving a
false positive. Again, the calculation is easier to see in a
simplified setting. Consider three coin-tosses of a biased
coin that produces heads with 90% probability. A single
tails appears in three sequences of results: tails-heads-
heads; heads-tails-heads; and heads-heads-tails. Each
sequence has one 10% event (a tails) and two 90%
events (two heads) which corresponds to each path hav-
ing probability (1-.9).92; keep in mind that if the number
of tosses were N, then the number of 90% events would
test. Both Kaye and Ayres and Nalebuff focus on the
error rate, 1 -r in my terms, which would produce
slightly different equations, but consistent after one
makes the appropriate substitutions.
be N-1. The probability that any of the three paths
materializes is 3(1-.9).91-1. Generalize by replacing 3 with
the number of the uncertain events N and .9 with the
probability that the DNA test rejects an innocent match,
r, to obtain N(1r)Il. That is the probability of exactly
one false positive. This calculation is also given by the
probability density function of the binomial distribu-
tion for N trials with probability of success in each trial
1-r.21 The corresponding intuition has two components.
First, one of the N members must receive a false posi-
tive. Since each receives a false positive with probability
1-r, this is N(1-r). Second, the remaining N-i members
of the intersection must all receive true negatives,
which is r". The resulting probability that exactly one
false positive appears is N(lr)l. The endpoint of this
branch appears in italics to signify that it corresponds
to the observation of exactly one positive. The sum of
the probability weights of all such endpoints forms the
denominator of the probability of Puckett's guilt.
The third branch of the triple branching contains the
remaining probability weight, one minus the probability
of the first two branches. This corresponds to more than
one positives appearing and is 1-r-N(1r)rIl.
From the remaining node that corresponds to the per-
petrator being in the database, the first uncertainty is
the obvious one, whether the perpetrator will receive
the true positive test. Despite that intuition suggests
that the probability of a true positive is the same as that
of a true negative, r, because different uncertainties
may arise, call the probability of a true positive v (what
some disciplines call the true positive rate or sensitiv-
ity of the test).22 Thus, the initial branching will be that
21 The mathematical knowledge repository
www.wolframalpha.com gives this result, for ex-
ample, if one enters "PDF[BinomialDistribution[n,
1-r], 1]" asking for the value of the probability
density function for obtaining one positive from a
binomial distribution with n trials with probability
of success 1-r.
22 Whereas we have a probabilistic sense of
false positives, we do not have a theory of false
negatives that is based on the probability theory of
DNA analysis because the test describes the DNA,
so if both the sample at the crime scene and the
sample from the perpetrator come from the same
individual, the perpetrator, then the test result will
necessarily be a match. Error can arise from sources
outside the theory of DNA matching, such as
sample contamination through laboratory error. See
Comm. on DNA Forensic Sci.: An Update, Nat'l
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the perpetrator, being in the database, will receive a
true positive with probability v, and will receive a false
negative the rest of the time, lv. Additional positives
may appear, however, and the probability tree needs
to exclude them.23 This happens by having a branching
after the true positive for either all remaining N-1 mem-
bers of the intersection receiving true negatives, with
probability r", or not, with probability 1-r1-. The first of
these endpoints corresponds to observing exactly one
positive and, therefore, is in italics. Because this is the
true positive, this endpoint is also in bold and its prob-
ability weight will be the numerator of the fraction that
gives Puckett's guilt.
After a false negative, again a triple branching appears.24
First, the remaining members of the database, N1, will
all produce true negatives with probability r1-. Second,
exactly one false positive will appear, in a way analogous
to Baker being the perpetrator but here the intersec-
tion is smaller by one member. The single false positive
appears with probability (N-1)(r-1)r'- 2 .This is the case
where exactly one positive appears and, therefore, is in
italics in the figure. The rest of the time, 1-r' '-(N-1)(r-1)
r1-2, two or more false positives may appear.
Research Council, The Evaluation ofForensic DNA
Evidence 134 (1996) ("NRC II") (explaining that it
cannot propose such a probability of error):
There has been much publicity about ... errors
made by Cellmark in 1988 and 1989, the first years
of its operation. Two matching errors were made
in comparing 125 test samples, for an error rate of
1.6% in that batch. The causes of the two errors
were discovered, and sample-handling procedures
were modified to prevent their recurrence. There
have been no errors in 450 additional tests through
1994. Clearly, an estimate of 0.35% (2/575) is
inappropriate [ly high] as a measure of the chance of
error at Cellmark today.
Rather, the implied error rate should be much
smaller, especially assuming the recommended
safeguards that include repeat testing by different
laboratories.
23 The simpler analysis for one or more posi-
tives would not need to exclude additional positives
and would not have this branching.
24 Again, the simpler analysis for one or more
positives would have a bifurcation here, between all
N-I remaining members of the intersection receiv-
ing true negatives with probability r"1-, and not,
with probability 1-rN.
Figure 10 displays the probability tree that results from
this analysis. The initial node is at the top left and eleven
endpoints appear on the right side. The four italicized
endpoints correspond to observing one positive and
three of those correspond to observing a false positive.
The italicized endpoint that is also bold corresponds to
observing exactly one positive and that positive being
true. The probability of Puckett's guilt has as its denomi-
nator the sum of the probability weights that corre-
spond to all four italicized endpoints. The numerator is
the true positive, the endpoint that is also bold.
VI. NUMBER CRUNCHING
The return from imagery to arithmetic requires us to
put numbers on various parameters. The accuracy
(true negative rate or specificity) of the DNA test is r
= 1,099,999/1, 100,000 = .99999909,25 the size of the
DNA database is 0 = 338,711,26 the probability that
the suspect is in the database is Pd = .6.27 The fraction
of the database that is male is I = .86 and the fraction
Caucasian is c = .284.28 The fraction of age is g = .425.29
Taking further fractions of the database, the fraction not
incarcerated is n = .67,30 the fraction without an alibi is
o = .5,1 and the fraction of the database that is not du-
plicated is s = .75.32 The prior probability of Baker's guilt
is p, = .3.33 The true positive rate v is assumed equiva-
lent to the true negative rate, r.
25 See Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 6 at 1476.
Note that the symbol r here is the accuracy of the
test, whereas Ayres and Nalebuff use r to symbolize
the error rate, what in my terms is 1 -r.
26 Id. at 1470.
27 Id. at 1479. Up to here the symbols coincide
with those of Ayres and Nalebuff but for this they
use p rather than Pd. They do not assign symbols to
the subsequent variables.
28 Id. at 1477.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 6 at 1478.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1488.
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Other (Baker): p&N(1-r)rv-1 = .002...
Not in the DB: (1-pB) (1-pd)N(l -r)r- 1 = .002...
In DB, true positive: (1-pB) pdv r v-1 = .416...




Table 2: The probability weights of each case of a positive and the
resulting calculation of the probability of Puckett's guilt.34
Applying the successively smaller fractions to the DNA
database gives the size of the intersection after all the
reductions as N = D x / x c x g x n x o x s = 338,711 x .86
x .284 x .425 x .67 x .5 x .75 = 8,789.72. In the context
of the illustrations, this is the size of the overlapping
population, the intersection of the population of 1972
San Francisco and the population of the DNA database
(instead of 100 that figures 7-9 show).
The remaining calculation depends on whether the set-
ting is one where exactly one positive is observed, as in
the probability tree of figure 10, or the simpler analy-
sis of one or more positives per notes 9 to 11. Table 2
shows that calculation (note 21 shows the correspond-
ing entries for the simpler analysis). Each row corre-
34 The entries of the simpler probability tree
corresponding to one or more positives (per notes
15 to 18) would be as follows: Baker: pB( _rN); Not
in DB: (1-PB) ( 1-pd) ( N-r"); In DB true positive: (1-
PB) Pd v; In DB false positive: (1-pB)pd(1 _V) (e'- 1);
numerator: 0.419...; denominator: 0.4246...; prob-
ability: .98913... The intuition behind the difference
of the two analyses appears if we let N go to infin-
ity. Then, the one or more analysis converges to the
probability of the perpetrator not being Baker, being
in the database, and receiving a true positive, (I-pB)
pdv, as many positives appear and one is likely to be
the perpetrator. By contrast, the probability of guilt
under the exactly one analysis approaches zero, as
more positives become exceedingly likely and see-
ing only one becomes unlikely regardless of guilt.
Spreadsheets of this model are available;
Excel: http://tinyurl.com/n4nxdhu; Google docs:
http://tinyurl.com/mwr5nna.
sponds to one of the ways of observing a single positive,
and shows the formula for its probability weight. The
last three rows produce the numerical results of the
calculations, the probability of Puckett's guilt, which is
98.9% under these assumptions.35
VII. CONCLUSION
That probability theory is difficult and counterintui-
tive is not news. Rather, the point is that the graphical
approach helps make this counterintuitive and very
complex analysis comprehensible and the calculations
tractable.
The graphical exposition clarifies the analysis. Some ar-
gue that juries should evaluate the probabilistic analysis
despite its complexity. Hopefully, courts can help juries
to handle this complexity. At the very least, however, if
juries are to evaluate probability theories, jurors must
see the corresponding probability tree and should
receive a spreadsheet in which they can see the effect
of changing estimates about the inputs into the calcula-
tion.
The key point, however, is that the model for analyzing
the Puckett setting captures the way that cold-hit DNA
identifications will tend to arise. In many cases, some
initial suspect may keep some probability of still be-
ing the perpetrator, as did Baker. Even if such a suspect
does not exist, the model still works by putting the cor-
responding probability (p,) at zero. This is the appropri-
ate analysis rather than the adjustment of the random
match probability that the second report of the national
research council proposed in 1996. The development
of general approach to evaluating DNA evidence means
that decisions, like Puckett, that ignore this analysis
without having truly different facts should be reversible
under the clearly erroneous standard.
35 See Ayres & Nalebuff, 67 Stanf. L. Rev. at
1488 (showing the exact same calculation.)
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